Northcape is the ongoing work of a British artist, and can broadly be descr… Read Full Bio ↴Northcape is the ongoing work of a British artist, and can broadly be described as downtempo melodic electronica. The latest Northcape album Exploration and Ascent, the follow-up to 2010's Captured From Static and 2011's Alluvial EP, was released by Sun Sea Sky Productions in early 2013. This was followed by the organically-inspired Glasshouse EP in 2014. Current work continues to widen and deepen Northcape's style of electronica, bringing in influences from a wide range of genres including IDM, electronica, shoegaze and ambient music. Previous releases include a first self-released CD in 2005, a second independent release ('Detach') in 2007 and an EP ('Some Bright Valley EP') on the Monotonik netlabel.

Marianas
Northcape Lyrics

We have lyrics for 'Marianas' by these artists:

bradystreet 16 that′s when I felt my freedom All my homies had…
D.U.B. Da Udda Band Mariana Mariana Idaman hati Takkan lama takkan lama Adik men…

The lyrics are frequently found in the comments by searching or by filtering for lyric videos

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01Nearer4:08

02Don't Let It Slip Away5:40

03Cold Calm4:28

04Geometry4:36

05Letter to Nowhere4:48

10Feel The Static3:27

11Stuck On Repeat5:24

PT5M40S

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Most interesting comment from YouTube:

FLJBeliever1776

Here's a thought for your Middling Scenario:

The Regia Marina learns of the American Pacific Fleet being shorthanded due to a somewhat costly battle.

Wanting to prove their mettle and gain some small amount of glory, the Italian King offers the Regia Marina for service in the Pacific. Admiral King seriously considers it, despite the Logistical Hurdles involved. As he could get Nimitz new Battleships, plus additional forces, from forces that are essentially sitting around doing absolutely nothing and without cost immediately.

But there are both military and political issues that make the idea very impractical or very difficult at best.

The Italians on the other hand, begin pressing a bit. The Italian King and officers are able to convince FDR to let them have a go. So, the US Navy accepts the Italian ships, though, they have to have their AA improved, but that's decided to just do it in their forward base and as the ships enter US Docks for resupply on the way. The ships still have to be worked up to improve themselves as well and additional guns could be placed on during the in between maintenance.

In addition, the Regia Marina secures the USS Reprisal CV-35 for their service. An incomplete Essex-class Aircraft Carrier that was eventually used historically as a Bomb Assessment Target and later scrapped at only 52.8% completion.

Back to the idea, in the meantime, a large number of available Italian pilots, both from its Air Force and its Fleet Naval Arm, volunteer for service in the Pacific to reinforce their own contingent. Namely, to help bolster American Air Power, including learning Carrier Operations, especially in light of their purchase of Reprisal.

Though, Reprisal would become something of a political headache later. Not the ship itself, but rather the Soviets. Seeing as the ship is now Italian, they want her as part of the reparations, but the Truman Administration flatly says no repeatedly, pointing out that the ship was acquired AFTER the Italians switched sides and therefore is not part of the Italian Reparations Agreement.

More importantly, Reprisal was nowhere close to being finished in 1945 and with post-war talks ongoing, the ship's construction could be either put on hold or finished as originally planned as USS Reprisal and the Italians refunded later on or given a pair of smaller Escort or Light Carriers later on for the same price.

Of course, there is other political consequences to FDR accepting the Italian Navy's assistance, plus various Air Units.

The French, or rather Du Galle, seeing the Italians going to the Pacific, decides to dispatch part of the Marine Nationale and some French air and ground forces to reclaim French Indochina at the earliest possible moment.

While honestly a move for National Prestige, there is some merit to the idea. Reclaiming French Indochina could potentially allow a joint effort with the British and Chinese to establish a new in road to move supplies into Southern China, while freeing British territories nearby and then providing supplies to them. Though it is incredibly long longshot point blank.

Nevertheless, there are now additional forces in the CBI Theater as well as additional ships for the Pacific.

And naturally, of course, the Royal Navy and Koninklijke Marine were looking to return to the Pacific as well. While the British were already doing so and having the ability, admittedly with a bit of trouble, the Koniklijke Marine was not so fortunate and had to ask for ships from both Britain and the USA.

The US Navy, not wanting to trouble itself more than was strictly necessary, but also needing some kind of reinforcement until their own Battleships were back, agreed to Lend Lease a number of ships originally planned for the US Navy or destined for the Soviets. The French and Dutch got some ships as did the Italians, so as to ease Logistics in some way. This included a number of Carriers, but the crews remained American, though with Officers from the three navies aboard to 'command' the ships and eventually having pilots.

Though, most of these forces wouldn't be available until 1945, within some kind of reason. While some ships would be available sooner, most went with what they could immediately get or had on hand. Not something Nimitz or MacArthur were too thrilled about because of the headaches that would surely follow. But still, the arrival of British, French, and Italian Battleships bolstered the American line until Lee's ships could return.

At the same time, what would be essentially the second to last Battleship engagement would lead to Marine Nationale, Koninklijke Marine, and the Regia Marina to order Battleships from US yards until they can have functionality in their own. They also purchased additional ships, such as Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Destroyer Escorts, Submarines, various Support Ships, and other ships of various types and purposes.

Part of it is military need and what is envisioned for the future, but a considerable part is to grease the wheels and get the Americans to agree to let them into the Pacific. The British do not need to do so, but ultimately send the plans for the Lion-class to America with a request to have them redesigned and built alongside the Malta-class Carriers whose plans are also sent.

Essentially a massive bribe, the US nevertheless agrees. There are political and economic considerations as well as military concerns on the USA side. But these agreements forge a closer unity and allow things to go far more smoothly.

Post-War, well, that's post-war. Until then, the Italians, French, British, and Dutch weigh anchor and sail onto history.

All comments from YouTube:

Drachinifel

2y↑332

Pinned post for Q&A :)

EDIT: With regards to the '7 out of 8 battleships' line, I meant to say "had built and available" as Missouri and Wisconsin were still on shake-down at the time, but I screwed up actually saying the line, apologies!

Dan Colley

Funny thing. Mistakes are something we ALL make. My Dad, a retired USN Senior CPO, frequently said, "if you're not making mistakes, you are not doing anything useful." As much info as you have to keep up with, it's remarkable that you keep up with it as well as you do !!! Good work. I always feel much better informed after partaking of your programs. Thanks.

Michael Kovacic

@Vincent LaVallee My comment reads "BB clash at Leyte", which is another what-if done by Drach some time ago. In this, Yamato, Nagato and 2 Kongos go up against 6 US standards, of which only 2 carry 16inch guns. So yes, there were most definitely 4 US BBs with 14inch guns present.

Also, not using a super-heavy AP shell doesn't automatically make European gun designs bad, as you imply. The Italian 15inch/50 gun had comparable penetration to a 16inch gun, and the German 406mm/52 gun achieved better penetration against vertical armor than the 16inch/45 with a significantly lighter shell, indicating higher velocity and a more favorable ballistic arc. Gun performance isn't solely determined by shell weight.

Vincent LaVallee

@Michael Kovacic There were NO 14" guns on the US battleships in this battle, so perhaps you are at a disadvantage in not knowing the respective power of each side. In addition, the US AP 16" projectile was not the weak (light) one use in almost all the European battleships, which means that they all had far more destructive power than what you have probably thought. If you are really interested, click on my name here, the click on 'About', and either email m,e or got o my website to get my ballistics file which shows the huge power (and penetration) difference with all other battleships, APART from the Japanese Yamato class, which is one of the main points/topics here.

But one more point, Drach mentioned that the Yamato did not have the angle or range that the Iowa's have, but that is not the case at all. The elevation of the Yamato guns was 45 degrees, just like the Iowa's. And their range was 26 miles versus the 23 miles of the Iowa's. The real advantage is that the America RADAR would have picked up the Japanese ships sooner, and this would perhaps have been a key factor.

The bottom line of this 'exercise' in this video is that there would have been a lot of loss of American lives and ships, which was not necessary at all, as history has clearly proven. Japan lost ALL those ships anyway, without the loss of any of these US ships considered in this mock battle. Admiral Lee was 100% correct, even if the torpedoes were not to be so devastating as there were at Guadalcanal. Drach did an EXCELLENT job!

Tennessee Homestead

What if Admiral W.A. Lee had sailed West ? Have you even looked at the map ? Or just regurgitating something you saw/heard ?

Andrew Taylor

2y↑1

@John Rodrigues The only Japanese ship with Radar guided fire control was Yamato and hers was bad by US standards. Even the Roberts had better targeting systems. All the rest of the Japanese ships were purely visual sighting and aiming. And while the Japanese did have the worlds best optics, it was an especially bad day for them. Lots of squalls, very low visibility. The Japanese ships could barely see each other. Plus you gotta give some credit for surprise factor. “Captain I think there’s something wrong with the rangefinder? It says those itty bitty ships are charging us at flank speed? That can’t be right?” And yes there was a certain amount of mismanagement. Kurita had his destroyers very badly positioned such that they were useless for a fight they should have been ideal for.

82 More Replies...

UnusedUsername01

2y↑567

Lee made the right call. He had little to gain by trying to go toe-to-toe with the Japanese in a night fight, and a lot to lose. At that point in the war, American air power was so dominant that it may well have seemed the Navy wasn't going to take meaningful casualties for the rest of the war, with the exception of the occasional sub attack. Why gamble away a winning advantage by playing into your enemy's few remaining strengths? The only thing that made the IJN relevant again was the kamikaze, and they didn't adopt that until the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

cwcsquared

The most casualties amongst the Navy were inflicted by Kamikazes

EAST COAST SAILING CENTER

I agree

daniel benton

Admiral Lee made the correct decision. The CVs, BBs, and the rest of the fleet were there to support the landings and ground support.

In addition, the BBs were sent west as an AA / Radar screen during the battle.

Gary Hill

@D. Oliver Gutiérrez Keep in mind that at this point in history the U.S. Navy did not know the Japanese had larger ships than them. They assumed the IJN ships were around the size of the Iowa's and had 16" guns.

30 More Replies...

prussianhill

2y↑566

I find it it amusing, I got into these videos (in part) because I need something interesting to listen to during my commutes, and Drach you apparently started the channel because, of all things, an interest in having something interesting to listen to on your commutes! Thanks for another quality video.

kevin s

@wallybooger1 100%. I never thought id laugh through any of these videos but I did

Darren Black

I usually put one of the 40min-1hr videos while cycling in the morning

RetroDude 96

2y↑1

I agree, I do the same thing every time I commute to work. I never learned more about naval machinery or appreciate Admiral King than from Drach.

Brent Christensen

2y↑1

Same I listen to them on my way to work.

shaider1982

2y↑1

Yup, listened to it while driving home.

17 More Replies...

Marty Moose

2y↑42

My Grandfather fought and lost his leg during the massive Banzai Charge while operating a M1917 Machine Gun. He was eternally grateful to Admiral Spruance/Lee for protecting their backsides instead of sending the battleships off into an Egotistical machoism contest. It meant the world to the men fighting and dying on the Island that the Fleet didn't leave them.

Regina Johansson

The battleships and some cruisers would have left, not the entire fleet. Imagine Leyte Gulf, without the Japanese Fleet having a chance to be present since they are on the ocean floor.

riotintheair

2y↑132

Anything could have happened, but even the best case outcome of a crushing US victory seems less good than the historic outcome, so I'd rate Lee's decision pretty highly. Lee seemed to understand the US strengths and felt obliged to play to them even though it meant he'd be playing 2nd fiddle - good man.

Andrew Taylor

2y↑2

Keep in mind there was likely some other things related to Intelligence that may have been going on there. Spruance had just been briefed in on the intelligence coup of getting their hands on Admiral Toga's Z plans. The Japanese Navy's plans for the defense of the Marianas. Right as they were departing for Saipan. Given the extremely classified nature of that intel he was limited in who else could be briefed in. Plus he was limited by who was already at sea. Inducations are Lee likely knew of the documents contents at that point. Mitcher and McCain among others, did not. Anyone who read that document knew the Japanese plan was likely to bait out the American fleet so Japanese surface units could run around the flank and attack the Marine invasion forces. Lee likely did not want to give chase, because the Japanese plan wanted him to give chase. Expected him to do so. And he knew this.

Greg Yantz

2y↑34

Putting your duty ahead of your ego, what a foreign concept these days.

John Rodrigues

2y↑154

Lee had fresh memories of taking an ad-hoc group into action against a well trained enemy. The Battle of Guadalcanal had also demonstrated the damage he could expect if he got into a night knife fight against the IJN. Remember his statement about our ships not being built for the a close in fight. The there is his primary mission, protect the main striking force of the USN, the carriers. If we assume he has at least taken damage he could be out of position to not be able to carry out his primary mission. It is a conservative decision, weighted to protect the carriers. His potential fleet would not have sailed and trained as a unit.They would have to be extracted from present assignments, Assembled along with their escorts, Again a group that would not have at least exercised together. As for the officer the made the comment that radar controlled gunnery doesn't care if it is night or day, this is true, but it also doesn't care if it is friend or foe.

John Rodrigues

2y↑4

@77thTrombone God bless him for being more interested in his mission than in personal Glory. I really wonder about Arleigh Burke overstepping his authority at Leyte Gulf.

77thTrombone

2y↑3

Right, and that was 1 comment from one gunnery officer, speaking for his own perspective, which could've been responsibility for anything from 1 turret to all guns of a specific ship. Lee had a bigger picture to keep in perspective.

John Rodrigues

2y↑2

@Carl Schwamberger I think it was a difficult choice, but the right one.

Carl Schwamberger

2y↑3

" Remember his statement about our ships not being built for the a close in fight. "

Doctrine for the USN had been for BB shootouts to be made at medium ranges. Well over 10,000 yards. The armor protection reflected this. Less resistance to enemy fire at 5000 yards that at 15,000 yards.

ALRIGHTY THEN

2y↑193

Fight to your strengths, not your opponents. If you can take out a Yamato battleship at the cost of 50 aircraft or 1-2 battleships, take the loss in aircraft. As interesting as this engagement would be for us to talk about 80 years later, for the men lost unnecessarily, it would have sucked.

The Pacific theater strategy of island hopping was to avoid fighting unnecessary battles, and this surface engagement was an unnecessary battle against ships that would have minimal effect on the war. Outside of Samar, what damage did they cause because they weren't sunk in the Phillipine sea?

Bufoferrata

2y↑1

@Bk Jeong : Friendly fire! OUCH! What a sad and inglorious end for the ship that led Admiral Mikawa's squadron at Savo Island. I always thought the Atago class were handsome ships, especially Chokai.
Cheers!

Bk Jeong

@Bufoferrata Yeah they never went off. Either an air attack knocked out her boilers(the Japanese did record her loss as this, and some primary American sources support it as well), or possibly friendly fire from Kongo.

One Japanese cruiser did have her Long Lances explode at Samar to fatal effect, the result of air attack: Suzuya.

Bufoferrata

2y↑1

@Bk Jeong : Interesting.
So, she didn't suffer a detonation in one of her quad type 93 launchers. What knocked out her boilers? Was it air attack?
I also didn't know about the Mikuma's Type 93's exploding. As I said, the Long Lance was a risky design. Not quite a suicide weapon, but dangerous to have on board.
Peace and stay well!

Bk Jeong

2y↑1

@Bufoferrata Chokai’s wreck reveals her torpedoes never actually exploded (which also debunked the long-held idea that White Plains sank her with gunfire, as that was how it supposedly happened). But there were a few other such cases, such as Mikuma at Midway.

Bufoferrata

2y↑4

@Bk Jeong : Good points.
The Type 93 was also quite a risky weapon to deploy. I'm not sure this is correct, but I've read that cruisers and destroyers armed with them had standing orders to jettison the torpedoes if under air attack due to the danger of a bomb hit, near miss or even a strafing attack setting them off. Several Japanese ships were sunk this way. There is some question as to whether this is what crippled the heavy cruiser Chokai at the battle of Samar. Some accounts say a hit from a five-inch shell fired by one of the CVE's or machine gun fire from the aircraft that were buzzing the Japanese fleet hit the ship's torpedo tubes. The explosion gutted her boiler rooms and left her dead in the water.
Once the U.S. forces had achieved near total air dominance, the Long Lance was more of a danger to it's users than the enemy, at least in daylight.

15 More Replies...

Six Turning Four Burning

2y↑161

I get the impression that US Naval officers from gunnery up to Nimitz himself still didn't fully understand radar. They seemed to think that radar was the great equalizer to counter Japanese night fighting skill. As seen in the various night battles in the Solomons radar just shows a blip on the screen. It did not show if the blip was a friendly or hostile. US warships with a radar contact still held their fire because they were concerned that the contact may be a friendly. Lee understood that even with radar in a night action would still be chaotic. Ships taking damage and/or sinking would disrupt the formation. Lee's concern about communication breakdowns would cause more chaos. The US Navy's advantage in numbers and quality of ships would have been negated. Lee made the right call.

Robert Dawson

2y↑2

@♥Olga Gaming♥ …. For starters there would have been a Japanese submarine campaign against the vulnerable American merchant fleet. Japan had good submarines and good torpedoes. But not a good strategy to use them against anything other than against enemy warships

♥Olga Gaming♥

What would happen if you switched Japanese and American admirals (for this scenario, no language barrier) simply Japanese admirals would command American fleets and American admirals (and their staffs) would command Japanese fleets... What would happen? Its my question :D

Robert Dawson

@Sean Mac …. Mostly he did. Relieving Admiral Fletcher being an exception. IIRC King also was involved in keeping Admiral Halsey in the fight longer than he should have been

Sean Mac

2y↑1

@Robert Dawson yeah although King mostly let Nimitz be Nimitz once figured out Nimitz knew what he was doing

Robert Dawson

2y↑2

@Sean Mac …. I was only speaking for myself. Nimitz had the world’s largest battlefield. Had to manage fleet commanders. With Admiral King looking over his shoulder

5 More Replies...

FandersonUfo

2y↑103

I think Lee knew it was better to let Japanese BBs get attrited by aircraft and submarines rather than slug it out in gun duels - he would not run away if he stumbled into a BB fight but knew there was more to lose than gain in fighting Japanese battleships directly

Edward Myers

What are you talking about I remember admiral lee transmitting stand aside I'm coming through and in a different night action off Guadalcanal and doing pretty well precisely because he understood radar and used it to great effect.

FandersonUfo

@Bk Jeong - America had extra money to make lots of mistakes - US was too rich to lose the Pacific war

Bk Jeong

@FandersonUfo This is correct, but the USN doesn’t tend to get nearly as much criticism as anyone else despite also making this mistake.

FandersonUfo

@Bk Jeong - everyone made the same mistake until Midway - they just finished off what was started pre-war - not many new BBs laid down after Midway I'd say

11 More Replies...

seventhson27

2y↑14

To Lee's credit, it was very telling that he didn't take up the engagement. A LOT of commanders would have taken up the challenge for their own self-aggrandizement. He did the right thing.

Jack Ray

2y↑46

I bought "Battleship Commander" after hearing your earlier video on Lee. It's a great book. I'm glad you bring naval history to others.

Wojciech Kasprzak

2y↑1

Bought, will start reading as soon as I finish watching this 😁

Vinny Ganzano

@TF BOND I asked for it as a Christmas present, great book.

TF BOND

Same here - I bought it on Drach's recommendation. Excellent book!

m riggs

2y↑94

While I would have enjoyed reading about a major Battleship to Battleship fight as well as the next guy, Admiral Lee did the right thing!
Even in a best case scenario, he was likely to take damage to at least some of his ships, possible severe damage with high casualties.
If things didn't go his way, between the torpedoes and the 18 inch guns of the Yamamatos, things could end quite badly, with severe damage, casualties, loss of ships, and potentially even loss of a Battleship or two! The Iowas weren't that heavily protected!
It is really easy for aggressive subordinates, such as Burke, or Naval historians to criticize after the fact, because they didn't have to make the decision.

THE NOTORIOUS K.E.K

2y↑1

@m riggs of course-engaging them when the USN could do what they did IRL would be foolhardy.

m riggs

@THE NOTORIOUS K.E.K
The point is, Lee didn't have to confront the Japanese fleet!
The carriers could from outside the gun range of any battleship, with the Battleships available if the air strikes failed!
As I said, as much as I would have enjoyed a full scale fleet action, the safe bet was the air strikes!
Less risk and fewer causalties..

THE NOTORIOUS K.E.K

@m riggs at this point there were very few people who had any idea of what guns the Yamato had-the consensus at the time was still a 45000 ton, 3x3 16 inch armed battleship, though some people in the navy were beginning to suspect a ship of 60000 ton, 3x3 18 inch armed ship.

m riggs

2y↑1

@Tyree
By this time in the war, we had a fairly good idea of the capabilities of the "long lance" torpedo, I believe a number of them were recovered from the beaches of Guadalcanal, and we certainly had enough experience of their effectiveness!
I don't know how much we knew about the Yamato. We knew they exisisted, their approximate size,and I think the size of their guns.

m riggs

2y↑1

@24Ufa
Your opinion is noted, but nobody talks much about the South Dakota Class armor protection, and I have never heard anyone claim their protection was superior.
The Iowas torpedo protection was inadequate, and their 12.25 inch armor was marginal against 16 inch shells, even with it being inclined. It was probably adequate for long range gunnery duels, but would have been vulnerable at closer ranges. It would have been inadequate against 18 inch shells.
Plus fire control and radar was vulnerable to damage, and with her unarmored superstructure, even 8 inch shells might have her rendered incapable of combat. Look at what happened to South Dakota at Guadalcanal.
Overall, most Naval experts seem to think the Iowas were fairly lightly armored compared to their Battleship peers in other Nations. Meaning ships designed and built in the late 1930s through WW2.
The armor probably would hold up well enough in a long range duel against a 16 inch gun, but I very much doubt it would have fared well against 18 inch guns.

6 More Replies...

Tyrone Marcucci

2y↑47

The Japanese "Long Lance" torpedo was a very, very real threat. Our cruisers did not carry torpedos and night battles are very confusing even in peace time practice. SMC USN. Ret.

Vinny Ganzano

2y↑2

Yeah there were only a few US cruisers left with torpedoes at that time of the war. The Japanese torpedoes were extremely destructive, especially to their carrying ships if a shell hits the tubes or near to them.

Gilbert Kohl

2y↑3

Esp having over 100, in the water, at night.

1 More Replies...

Aleksander Domański

2y↑44

In World of Warships some players just want to win harder. When they are winnig they take risks and often jeopardise whole effort, often losing in the end. Mr Lee would not be one of them. He understood that when you are winnig there is no point to take big risks (nightfight is alvays risky). Wise guy.

Scott Giles

2y↑6

Should have made him an Admiral or something...

7thsealord

2y↑7

It's easy to judge decades after the fact, but I also think Lee was right to be cautious. A more aggressive strategy MAY have yielded good results, but there were also ways it could have gone horribly wrong.

It's rather like what was said of Jellico at Jutland, that he had the means to lose the war in an afternoon.

MemorialRifleRange

You mean say as I sit here on my couch eating popcorn with my dogs, 80 years after the fact and 0 responsibility for anything that I shouldn't slight Lee for his decision??? Gee whiz you're harsh......

Kevin Eastin

2y↑54

Wear the "Don't you mean 7 of 10" comments as a badge of honor Drach. It is because of you and your videos that so many know that.

Tom Dolan

2y↑65

Aviators and submariners weren't risking large surface assets with thousands of personnel by being overly aggressive especially with a formation who had not operated as a separate unit to practice surface combat.

recoil53

At this point in the war, victory seemed certain if no needless risks were taken - like potentially throwing away large amounts of assets.
Industry meant that numerical superiority grew by the day. If the Americans did nothing outright stupid - like facing Long Lance torpedoes at night - then it was simple fantasy by Japan and Germany that they could force such a devastating battle that they could even get breathing space.
That doesn't even account for the superior training programs of America.

Tom Dolan

2y↑4

@John 819 Agreed....there was less at risk during their operations. Admiral Lee was acutely aware of his ships were a much more significant investment.

John 819

They were expendable.

Boating Explained with Cap'n Drew

2y↑7

Those old battle wagons were really fearsome weapons. Many are currently museums. They even let you sleep on them overnight. I’ve stayed on the Massachusetts and New Jersey with my sons when they were in the Scouts and toured the Wisconsin while visiting my son who is stationed in Norfolk, VA. These things are massive. You could spend days and not see them in their entirety. When we were touring the “Big Wisky” (USS Wisconsin) in Norfolk, my son commented that, in comparison, his ship (itself nearly 700 ft and 9500 tons) “feels like a tuna can.” 🤣 If you ever get a chance to visit one of these “bad boys,” give it a full day. You won’t be disappointed!

Jonathan Strong

A couple of years ago i went on board Big Wisky in Norfolk Along-with the Big-J at times

Thomas Knobbe

2y↑25

You cover many more what-ifs than I could ever envisage. Two thoughts: Primarily, this battle takes place in 1944, not 1942. The Navy is winning the war at this point, it does not have to take the same risks that it had to at Midway, or Guadalcanal. So, Lee does not really have to engage the Japanese unless he really believes that he has the advantage. Having already experienced what they could do at night, he would have been prudent to wait for the kind of advantage that Jessie Oldendorf had at the Surigao Straight. (Burke had indeed had success against Japanese naval forces at night, but he had also had the time to work out his tactics and train his officers and crews before attempting to do so.) Second, Lee was also tasked with protecting the carrier force, in concert with a landing on a strategically important set of Japanese islands, and he took this responsibility seriously. Would that Admiral Halsey had maintained a similar sense of responsibility off Samar. It is always easy to second-guess a decision with hindsight; it is helpful to consider at what point in the war a commander is having to make the decision.

Bob Smith

@Ramal The aircraft of the Taffy's were available to give TF 34 air cover off San Bernadino Strait.
.

Thomas Knobbe

2y↑1

@Petrie W this is a very good point. We tend to think of people as static personalities, as always behaving the same way over places and time. It is quite possible that by 1944 the stress of ongoing command had worn Admiral Halsey down, and he was not able to consider all the options, and all the possibilities, as he could two years previously. I have not studied the typhoons that struck his fleet on, what, two occasions? Might the chronic stress of constant command have had something to do with the evident mistakes he was making at this point?

Petrie W

2y↑2

@Thomas Knobbe Halsey was also most definitely being effected by the stress of of the early wars years and probably should have been rotated out before that point for health reasons. Not to take anything away from his service, but he was still only human and by all accounts he had not been at the top of his game for some time before that

Redman29

2y↑3

@Patrick Donnolley Halsey was senior to Spruance so never would of worked. Would of also been a slap in the face to Mark Mitscher who turned Taskforce 38/58 from a concept into a well oiled machine. And it has been well documented that Halsey did more harm than good when he tried to micromanage Mitscher and have a hands on approach in regards to Carrier Operations. Simply put, Carrier tactics had changed since 1942, Halsey was using the old book and overriding Mitscher who wrote the new book.

3 More Replies...

scark00

2y↑11

Lee was smart. He did not look at a problem from one angle. He was capable of three dimensional thinking. Anyone who could do calculus in his head was capable of seeing multiple outcomes and see which one was most beneficial!

DJP 1972

2y↑1

Its called smarter, NOT harder

Michael Snyder

2y↑2

To finish my comment, theoretically Lee had immense advantages over a Japanese Surface Action Group. During the day, with air supremacy, he could sit over the visual horizon using aerial spotting at 30,000 yards, even laying a smoke screen at the limits of the visual horizon to further conceal his battleline. The Japanese would have few indications of his position and course/speed on which to base "browning" shots with the Type 93 torpedoes. At night, he held the same advantages Oldendorf had a few months later, when his rebuilt BBs could have set up outside the Japanese visual range and dropped shells on them to which they couldn't reply except if they could see his gun flashes. Lee could sit his battle line at 30,000 yards and used a couple of light cruisers and his DDs, reinforced by a division from the carrier TFs to keep the IJN light forces at bay, backing them with his CAs. His equality in speed allowed him to maneuver to prevent the Japanese battleline from closing. The real threat would be a naval "banzai" charge with the "Kongo" CBs and the IJN CAs to punch a hole in his screen and get to visual range for torpedoes. The first issue for him was that his ships had not trained and exercised together for a surface action, though he had issued an SOP and he had a comm net. I forgot the point out the massive advantage that the CIC gave US commanders, allowing them to "see" the situation from fused and integrated sources and respond to it, where before a fleet commander could only know what he saw or what his ships reported to his flag bridge for plotting (one of the missions Beatty forgot about at Jutland). The second may have been that there was no need to risk his ships and the lives of his sailor's in a battle the USN was already winning unless a situation developed where an IJN SAG broke through and was heading for the amphibious force. Lee was not a "glory hog" and neither was Spruance. Had Halsey been there we might have got the surface engagement given his aggressive nature. But such an engagement would result in Americans deaths without changing the tactical, operational and strategic outcomes.

M Bryson

2y↑6

Uncle Drach, your explanations that make it plain that battles do not take place in a vacuum add so much to my understanding of naval history. I very much appreciate the way you share your knowledge.

Charles Wade

2y↑2

My interest in military history is all over the board. Specifically WW2 in general. Finding your channel is a godsend. I’ve learned so much more than I did in school. My grandfather served on LST 1014. He told me a few stories about beach landings. His duties included ships cool and gun captain on a 40mm boaforce .

Yuzuriha

2y↑3

I suspect the skill of the various ships CIC staff is what Lee was worried about. And it doesn't take a lot of moving elements for a CIC to get overwhelmed as happened when kamikaze tactics became commonplace. At a cursory glance, the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay does appear show that even with CIC and radar(as its late '43), nightfighting can still get really confusing even for the IJN.

Joshua Rosen

2y↑10

You have to be incredibly impressed with the guy. The temptation to fight history's last great battleship battle must have been incredible. But from a strategic point of view there was nothing to gain and a lot to lose. We had complete air superiority by that point, you could practically walk across the Pacific on the decks of Essex class carriers while the Japanese were scraping the bottom of their pilot barrel. We were going to sink the remainder of the Japanese fleet sooner or later, he knew that. The battleships were needed to bombard beaches, that wasn't as glamorous as sinking another battleship but it was much more important for bringing the war to an end. He put the war's needs, and the lives of his men, above his own need for glory.

Matthew Huszarik

2y↑13

It sounds like Lee understood modern carrier tactics much earlier and better than many of his contemporaries. The surface fleets primary reason for existence is to defend the carriers.

Patrick Donnolley

2y↑1

The same man who advocated to reducing the order for Alaska-Class Super Saiyan Cruisers for more carriers.

MainiacJoe Plays Dungeon Crawl Stone Soup

2y↑2

The same thing happened at Okinawa. The battleships were offered a surface engagement against Yamato and elected to let the planes do it instead.

Gary Binder

2y↑10

VERY interesting. The battles for the Marianas and the Philippines certainly offer a huge range of "what ifs".. I think Spruance is often criticized for his caution in not leaving the invasion force under-protected. Watching our videos and playing our wargames we often forget that the commanders lacked the "God's eye view" that we enjoy.. Spruance had to stay close to the invasion site to accomplish the greater mission. As you stated, Lee also had the combat experience to not want to ply to known Japanese strengths. By that point in the war, the USN had finally accepted that the Japanese had an excellent torpedo and were quite good at using them. Who really wants to get into a barroom fight where both parties have very big clubs and could hurt each other badly. Admittedly the cold logic says that the USN could trade battleship losses with Japan and still come out the winner, but as you have shown there are factors that could shift the advantage to either side. Another less tangible factor for Lee; he knew each one of his battleship captains and he had reports on the effectiveness of each ship. Who knows, perhaps any combat losses would have caused the Kentucky and the Illinois to be finished (I think Montana was already canceled by then).

MGBait

2y↑11

I just heard “100 long lances” being in the water and I shuddered. That is a frightening amount of roulette death headed your way.

John Ferguson

@Gerard LaBelle That is the general idea in Tom Clancy's "Red Storm Rising", where the Soviets launched about a hundred anti-ship missiles. Even though the Americans took out many of the missiles, it only took a couple to do in a capital ship.

Gerard LaBelle

The PRC navy might be planning a similar tactic against US carrier groups. The Chinese have large numbers of shore-based, long range anti-shipping missiles. In a war, they could simply fire enough missiles simultaneously to overwhelm a US force’s point defenses, should it approach the coast of China.

Peter Brezniak

2y↑9

As usual a SUPERB presentation...the use of moving pictures brought the story to life....more of this please...my only regret is that as I am 59 (in Aptil) that I will probably never see a large portion of your future content especially after the various declassifications occur. My deep respect and appreciation as always.

andrew reynolds

2y↑8

What Lee feared and indeed had experienced was the roll of luck that ruled these night engagements. I think he was right not to risk so much when AirPower already held a strong advantage.

The 225677th Fragment of the Man-Emperor of Mankind

2y↑38

A what if scenario where Admiral Lee had a Battleship fight? This is where the fun begins (But not fun for the IJN)

khaela Mensha

2y↑4

You mean we will have a new long poking device episode (flying ones for a change ^^) :)

Paul Dame

2y↑29

Lee did the right thing. Risking his ships in a night engagement just because you wanted a glorious big gun duel would be like foregoing dropping the atomic bombs in favor of proceeding with Operation Olympic just to prove the superiority of American infantry and artillery.

Matt Blom

2y↑6

The idea of a ship I'm on being hit by a close range 18" shell from a Yamato class is the stuff of nightmares.

Jonathan Strong

A-YIKES I SAY!

James Frost

2y↑3

Agreed, Iowas were probably the "best" battleship but if ANYTHING on the water caught a Yamato shell, let alone a full salvo...

John Howard

2y↑4

I have often wondered about Lee taking on Japanese Van force at Battle of the Phillipine Sea. I really enjoyed this video. If Lee did not feel that his force was prepared to take on the Japanese at night then I feel it was for the best. I really enjoy your alternative history videos. Thank you.

Brian Barrigar

2y↑2

I really enjoy these alternate history, big gun fleet engagement videos. It is very interesting to think about how these fights could have gone. I would love to see more of these!

CJ Knoll

2y↑16

For the first 22 minutes of the video, I was trying to figure out why the Americans would be hesitant to engage the Japanese in a surface engagement, being as Lee had 7 modern battleship, 2 of which were Iowa class ships. (I had no idea what the van force consisted of)

Then the Van Force was shown and my first though was, and I quote "Oh shit".

The Hippy Griff

2y↑3

Yeah. Nobody sane takes on that force unless absolutely necessary, no matter the odds. Casualties in such a battle would be horrific.

Joseph Enriquez

2y↑3

I think Sun Tzu would be proud of Admiral Lee's analysis on why he should not sail west to engage the IJN in a night surface action. He had a healthy respect of his command's capabilities and the enemy's.

This is one of those alternate scenarios that might have ended up worse than the outcome of OTL. The other one would be the Battle off Samar.

mrackerm

2y↑8

Think back to the words of Adm Jellico at Jutland, "When you are winning, risk nothing." While Lee's battle line was not winning itself, the overall battlegroup was winning. Why risk surface units in a risky and unnecessary night engagement.

The Viscount

2y↑3

Given the choice, I'd serve Lee over Halsey any day. Lee could have taken a major victory in a surface action, sure, but he also knew he could suffer a crushing defeat with the difference in disposition and after his early fight with SD and WA vs Kirishima and her flotilla. He chose a missed tactical opportunity to avoid opening a major hole in the CV screen should he suffer multiple BB's disabled or worse. In such a scenario, even had he won a tactical victory, the effective loss of a battleship would significantly decrease the available heavy AA, and, should that result in the loss of a carrier, that could be career ending. This is without mentioning the risk to his men and the men he was escorting. While this point in the war couldn't stop the US victory, a strategic setback at this stage was entirely possible, and such a setback in an unnecessary engagement at the cost of his men and his main objective would be viewed much less ambiguous by history. So yeah, give me a commander who values war victory over short term tactical gains and who values his men more than personal glory. I'll serve the likes of Lee and Nimitz over Halsey any day of the week.

Asbestos Muffins

2y↑19

3:05 "Did you correct for the relative speed of the island?"
"What's the relative speed of the island?"
"Nothing, its an island"

Decentish

2y↑3

You have to respect Lee for declining the engagement. He loved commanding battleships and this was his dream engagement, like the line battles of old. But he gave up the opportunity to protect his men.

B1900pilot

2y↑9

I think VADM Lee once again demonstrated his superior judgement and decision-making, which furthermore didn't require him to use his equally superior tactical skill in battle..."Just because you can, doesn't mean you should." I think that the superior radar, especially radar-controlled gunnery makes a night engagement favorable to the US Navy. However, Lee rightly understood the absolute requirement for effective C3 ( Command, Communication and Control ) coupled with adequate training and experienced crews in night tactics. Doctrine is one thing, but execution of doctrine requires training, exercising these skill sets and experience. I'll echo what ADM Ozawa said, "Your electronics were superior"...The electronic war was decisive in WW2, and especially in the Pacific, however, ADM Lee understood what his overall strategic role was within the battle fleet, and pursuing a fleet action in the Philippine Sea just didn't add up to a wise decision...ADM Lee was an amazing man, brilliant, studied and considerate of his men...He made the right decision(s) throughout the war, and more importantly...LEARNED from his experience...

Jonathan Strong

1y↑1

Yeah good thinking on his part and as a naval-officer had said If you're not lucky we can't use you

Lane Doby

2y↑2

Lee took the information that he had, plus the known capabilities of his ships and their crews, considered his primary mission objectives, and made the best decision. Simple as that.

Doug Thomas

I find it curious that Admiral Lee did not aggressively use this overwhelming surface force to battle the Japanese fleet. It quite possibly may have circumvented the Battle of Leyte Gulf. It's very hard to say which battle would have been more costly however, but at least Lee had carriers to back him up. Also, Lee was probably husbanding his battleships and cruisers to bombard Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.

Helium Road

2y↑4

30:58 video like that always amazes me to see how fast one of these giant battleships actually can move. The fact that the Iowa class is able to keep up with modern nuclear carriers is telling; the term "fast battleship" is well deserved.

Tim Claridge

2y↑1

Just finished reading that very section of Battleship Commander! Very thoughtful of you Dach, to provide an immediate verbal appendix to chapter 12😀

Maddog3060

2y↑6

In war you really need to anticipate the Worst Case scenario as being the likely one. Whether it was actually likely or not. As many others in the comments have stated, Lee made the right decision; by now it was clear to everyone that air power was what was going to win the war, and our carriers were definitely shifting things in our favor. Better to play it safe and let the aircraft pummel the enemy into submission rather than risk losing years of construction and investment for vainglory.

James Young

2y↑3

One thing that would have lessened the Japanese chances, even in the worst case, was they had even less opportunity to train than Lee's forces due to fuel issues. I can't remember how long it'd been since Yamato / Musashi had even fired the main guns, but it was something horrific.

Gregory McFann

2y↑1

I think Lee was a realist. While aggressive subordinates wanted to charge straight at the Japanese battle line, dreaming of a second Jutland and lots of glory for themselves, Lee saw the big picture. He knew that the carriers were the queens of the fleet and that the fast battleships existed for one reason only - to protect and serve the carriers. The old battleships were the only ones that had a chance of engaging in a surface action, as happened at Surigao Strait, and that was because they were basically expendable. Engaging the Japanese battleships would cause far more damage to the Americans that to the Japanese. Even if all the Japanese ships were eventually sunk, the Americans would be at best heavily damaged, and maybe even some of the battleships would be sunk, which would hamper carrier operations for many months in the future. The video points out the problems 1) the action would be fought at night, and Lee had already learned the hard way how good the Japanese were at night fighting 2) Lee's forces were untrained in surface engagements 3) the Japanese had a deadly weapon - the Long Lance torpedo - which the Americans had no answer for (American torpedoes in WW2 were crap, due to prewar underfunding in torpedo development). In a night action with salvoes of Long Lances being launched, the battle line could well have been devastated, with no effective way to fight back. It has to be borne in mind that modern battleships like the Yamato and Musashi could not be sunk by gunfire alone. (In fact both of them were eventually sunk by mass torpedo bomber attack). Even if carrier air could have sunk them next day, it would still be a pyrrhic victory. Lee made the right call.

ifga16

2y↑1

Very good presentation. I personally prefer the US wins big. A bit of trivia regarding your lead photo of Missouri firing it's turret two. The photo was part of a Missouri Comes of Age article in a 1944 National Geographic and was firing in the Caribbean Sea during work ups. The 4x5 color negative was almost destroyed in a flooding accident at the Naval Photo Archives in Washington DC when a water pipe burst in the late 80s. A shipmate of mine was stationed there and rescued it and many others. I also and a black light poster of that shot for many years. I wish that I still had it.

Master Mariner78

2y↑1

Had the pleasure of being enrolled in a class on Naval History by Clark Reynolds. Best and most interesting teacher I ever had. A class that you actually looked forward to attending.
Also, having used radar my entire career, I do not remember any difference between night and day. I suppose it depends on the frequency and I have no idea of the frequencies used in 1944 as surface search and fire control were likely different.

C B

2y↑6

Lee provided his best military advice for winning the war. Not only was he correct (IMO) to decline a night surface action, but he was correct for operational and strategic reasons. By the time of Philippine Sea, the IJN could no longer win the war and that was primarily due to unrestricted submarine warfare on the merchant fleet and constant hammering from aircraft. Why change the calculation by risking assets that take years to build?

Trevyn Lane

2y↑1

Would be interesting to see this wargamed out. Not that I doubt your analysis, just would be fun to see a Battle of Texel style video for this battle.

Robert F

2y↑2

Good afternoon Drach. I love your analysis of this situation.

Admiral Lee was a highly competent officer, aggressive when he needed to be but NOT a "Halsey" type of "ATTACK, repeat ATTACK" aggressive. He appears to me to have been a more thoughtful officer, perhaps even more so than Admiral Spruance (who was known to go haring off with USS Iowa, looking for a fight on at least one occasion.)

I think Sun Tsu would have approved of the man. Lee knew both the strengths and weaknesses of his force and had a very good idea of the strengths and weaknesses of his opponents.

Hindsight being 20/20, I think he reached the correct decision.

seventhson27

2y↑2

Kantai Kessen (Japanese Decisive Battle Doctrine), which the Japanese had been itching for since the beginning of the war, called for a cloud of Long Lance torpedoes to be unleashed first thing in the battle. The Japanese had a LOT of Long Lance torpedoes.

The Japanese got their Kantai Kessen, but it didn't go quite the way they'd planned.

BluejacketWarrior

Welp. After returning home from sea back in late Oct after 6 months I have FINALLY Caught up with your videos Drach. Thanks for all the great content.

Nun Ya

2y↑22

I believe that Lee was 100% correct in his decision making. There was nothing to gain.
A single 18" shell hitting ANY ship could well kill a hundred or more men. It is easy to imagine a thousand or more dead. Air power can do the same job, with far fewer dead.

John Ferguson

@Vinny Ganzano Unless your name is Willis Augustus Lee, Jr. ;)

Vinny Ganzano

The thing is battleship guns don't often hit their targets.

Frank DeMaris

2y↑23

The general understanding of the time is that battle line strength is based on the square of the number of (competitive) battleships. Pre-war, 15 battleships vs 10 would have seen a relative strength over 2 to 1 (225 to 100), for a clear US advantage. This scenario is 7 to 5, for a ratio of 49 to 25, almost 2 to 1. However, the fact that one battle line is twice as strong as, and should easily defeat, the other does not mean the victorious battle line will not take damage and/or losses. Why volunteer to take damage to expensive battleships that will take months to repair (if not sunk) when you can use air power with cheap attrition units that will be replaced by the next few day's production?

nixlarfs

@Frank DeMaris @Helium Road Lanchester's laws can be used to model this

Frank DeMaris

@Helium Road not that I know of. I ran across it in Nofi and Dunnigan's Dirty Little Secrets of World War 2.

Helium Road

Does this have a fancy name, like the Pythagorean Battleship Theorem or something lol?

MrNicoJac

2y↑2

That squaring 'trick' is neat! :)

I just want to point out that, if you're doing 7v5, one lucky hit to a radar antenna can effectively reduce that to 6v5, which sucks.
In a 15v10, whose force ratio isn't THAT much higher, one (un)lucky hit brings you to 14v10, which is obviously a much less significant drop in ratio!

So being "twice as strong" STILL skews in favor of having more engaging ships, because your Hood/Scharnhorst/Norfolk changes decrease :)

Frank DeMaris

2y↑5

@UnusedUsername01 I'm also remembering the other decisive win the US scored off Guadalcanal, October's Cape Esperance. Despite achieving almost complete surprise with the gun line and shooting up Aoba, Furutaka, and the lead destroyer, USS Boise still took a shell hit that burned out much of the fore part of the ship and killed over a hundred men.

1 More Replies...

Jeff Mcdonald

That's the kind of skipper you want to sail with. A sailor knows what he wants to do, a Captain knows what he CAN do.

Vito Tuxedo

2y↑1

Superbly well done Drach! I generally eschew floating or commenting on "what ifs"; they are notoriously fraught with complications, which require multiple assumptions, any one of which can undermine one's conclusions. However, I can say with certainty that Lee's decision was NOT based on anything remotely like a lack of courage. That simply was not in his character, as I understand it. And his instincts — based on battle-tested experience — had a track record of success that only a fool would second-guess.

Tommy Pouch

2y↑15

I have to agree with estimates. I am quite sure Admiral Lee (in addition to any other flag officer) would have studied the battle of Jutland, and understand that having superior numbers does not guarantee victory… and also Lee’s previous experience at Guadalcanal, would have to had a great influence on what he did. What did happen was that the invasion of the Marianas went off unhindered by the Japanese Navy, and his ships remained intact and capable of further offensive action. Yes, letting the Japanese get away allowed them to initiate the Battle of Leyte Gulf. But that wasn’t Ching Lee’s fault. In a perfect world, Spruance would’ve listened to Mitscher and attacked earlier upon his submarines sightings. As it is, the subs got Taiho and Shokaku; however, with multiple attacks from any or all four of the task groups, a lot more ships than a light carrier may have gone down. Add to this, a few hits on Yamato and Musashi (because as history shows it takes A LOT to sink them), maybe these ships aren’t included in the Center Force later.
I tend to agree with you that the potential surface fleet action was a gilded invitation to the US ships eating a whole lot of long lances, whether they had the tactical advantage or not.
Same thing Jellicoe considered at Jutland, right? As Professor Lambert put it, ‘yes the Germans may have won a tactical victory, but their fleet never sallied out again. They knew they would be destroyed.’ The IJN lost nearly its entire air group and three carriers, and provided absolutely no help to its garrison on Saipan.

Chris Moraal

Definitely would be fun to try and play out the second scenario in a game!

BOOMAN

As the most decorated battleship in ww2 with 15 battle stars im glad our USS NORTH CAROLINA BB-55 is here in Wilmington NC for all to see and visit. And would have been ready for a fight that day, having already survived a long lance hit once before. :}

Patrick Donnolley

2y↑9

So just like in your Task Force 34 video. Lee would have been responsible for the near single handed extinction of the Kongo-Class.

Scott Giles

2y↑2

No "Kongo Line" jokes yet? Lot here might not be what they use to.

Jay Felsberg

I admire your efforts to get battleships into a fight against each other.

TJ Andersen

2y↑8

The Japanese were adept at night action, and the US had major aviation advantage during the day. Lee's decision seemed prudent and moreover he probably saved many US lives. It wouldn't make headlines or sensational history, but Lee was not a grand stander. Bully for him.

Jon south

2y↑2

The worst-case scenario assumes Lee is still alive an 18.1 inch shell to the bridge or magazine could seriously hamper his command and control abilities and with the sudden loss of leadership, the US battle line could disintegrate.

FLJBeliever1776

James McDonnal

Great job! Time and time again the reason given for the construction of super battleships and the development of the long lance torpedo is IJN persued “quality over quantity “. Why then did they neglect the development of radar?

kwad8

2y↑18

15:24 Don't you mean Adm Lee 7 of 10 fast battleships the US built? 2 North Carolinas, 4 South Dakotas and 4 Iowas. He was missing 1 South Dakota and 2 of the Iowas.

kwad8

2y↑1

@Drachinifel Ah i see. Thanks for the reply. That just makes Adm Lee seem that much more impressive. Almost Every new battleship the US build they gave to Lee. haha.

khaela Mensha

2y↑6

@Drachinifel This channel is impossible ! Too many experts ^^ Drach next time, just say it was a check to see if people were really listening to you :) Thanks for the amazing work !

Drachinifel

2y↑21

I meant to say "had built and available" as Missouri and Wisconsin were still on shake-down at the time, but I screwed up actually saying the line :)

Niall Cunningham

I think the most unrealistic aspect of the optimistic scenario is the idea of a neat fire plan - these ships will engage those ships, these other ships will engage those other ships. It's something that looks great on paper or in a war-game - but this was something that admirals struggled to do in daylight. You can't identify the targets - the battleships, heavy cruisers and even the escort carriers will all look the same on radar. You have a small fuzzy 9" PPI display - you can tell the difference between periscope, a destroyer and a battleship - if you can break clear contacts out of the clutter - but that is pretty much it. You only have an approximate idea of what forces you are facing - just look how inaccurate most airborne scouting reports are. And communication between ships is limited - even with TBS radio - messages tended to be short and coded - basic codes - nothing too complex - but not conducive to having long detailed discussions. So especially at night you are reliant on individual ships fighting according to doctrine more than any idea of a organised battle plan - much beyond some basic objectives and some pre planned maneuvers. Once the shooting starts then yes you can get more information from starshells and visual sightings etc - but the confusion is also going to increase and trying to organise a fire plan once the shells have started flying is even more unlikely.

Gustav Chambert

Lee definitely made the right call. You don't fight to the enemy's strength, not unless you absolutely have to.
Sure, you have seven modern, fast battleships.
Sure, they have radar.
But all it takes is one good torpedo run, from one Japanese destroyer and you could lose two or even three BBs, and the only realistic way for that to happen is in a night action.

dalton knox

The various night actions off Guadalcanal were mostly disastrous for the US navy, thanks largely to the Long Lances, so I think Lee's caution was good sense.

Wolfeson28

2y↑5

7:21 I could understand other (more eager) officers at the time of the battle having this view of Lee, but I'm quite astonished to hear a historian well after the fact effectively accusing Lee of cowardice. I think Lee's record clearly shows that he was perfectly willing to take on the risks of major combat, but he also understood how high the risks of a night surface battle could be and when it was justified to take those risks.

In 1942 off Guadalcanal, Henderson Field was a vital strategic objective to keep in operation, the IJN was coming back to bombard it, and the only way to stop them was for Lee to put his ships in their way. So in that case, the risks of a night action were justified, and we know what happened there. In 1944 off the Marianas, however, it was a very different story. There, Lee knew that the US fleet had another option for attacking the Japanese (carrier airstrikes) which would provide them with far greater advantages, and were likely to inflict at least as much damage as his battleships could without nearly the same risk. So when Lee recommended against a night surface action, he was effectively urging Mitscher and Spruance to fight that more advantageous air battle instead.

I feel that Lee's assessment of risk versus reward was accurate, and was also in keeping with Spruance's overall approach the campaign. Keep in mind that even a single Long Lance hit on one of Lee's ships would likely have cost more lives than the USN lost in the entire historical battle. And if two or three of Lee's heavy ships had actually been sunk, at night in the middle of the open ocean, the casualties might easily have been 10 times what the USN historically suffered.

Wolfeson28

@Rembrandt972 Ya, that's what I was saying. I could understand someone like that gunnery officer on the Iowa (who seemed very eager to fight the night battle) having a negative view of Lee's recommendation, though I'd still disagree with them. I just cannot comprehend how a historian looking from decades later with access to all of the information could possibly think that Lee recommended against a night battle because he "wasn't willing to take the same risks that the aviators and the submariners were taking every day".

Rembrandt972

2y↑1

I dunno, there are a lot of words you could use to describe the great Ching, I wouldn't use coward as one.

B1900pilot

VADM Lee was obviously both a realist and a pragmatist. He knew the circumstances at the Philippine Sea situation were not going to be tactically to his advantage. I think he also recognized that this particular carrier engagement was an opportunity to knock Japanese carrier airpower out of the war. He saw, and rightly so his job albeit his duty to protect the carriers.

Joe6168

2y↑9

Lee made the correct call, a night action would have gained little if anything and risked heavy damage and casualties to his own force when American air power was already heavily dominant.
This would have been as Jingles likes to call it a case of trying to win harder.

Ripper VTOL

and or a sudden rush of shit to the brain :D

hotttt28

1y↑1

Chin Lee was the best and most charismatic admiral the USN ever had !

Jim Smith

2y↑4

Drach this was a very well put together piece of reasoning and thought out very well. My hat is off to you good sir.

hotttt28

Have you thought of covering The disastrous mind sweeping efforts to preclude the landing at Anzac And the insulin battle of Gallipolli Opening up the Dardanelles by the British French and Russian forces?

Tom Dolan

2y↑3

I wonder what the fuel state was for the various formations? The Japanese had been depending on increasing the range of their strike aircraft by shuttle bombing using the airfields on Guam.

Engine33Truck

2y↑1

Being a forward thinking person, I imagine the consequences of this action. Best case scenario for Lee means there would likely be no major surface offensive a few months later at Leyte Gulf. Any surviving Japanese battleships would be in dry dock for repairs, likely taking them completely out of the war. That would leave only Nagato, Fusō, Yamashiro, Ise, and Hyūga to form the nucleus of a possible offensive. That being said, had an offensive materialized, there most certainly would be no Southern Force coming through the Surigao Strait, meaning Kincaid would not consider any force coming through the Surigao Strait to be a serious enough threat to line his end of the strait with battleships, leading to TF77 being likely positioned further north at the San Bernardino strait to meet this sad excuse of a “Center Force” (or whatever it would’ve been called). Middle and worst case scenarios for Lee would’ve meant no possibility of TF34 even being considered for Leyte Gulf, and possibly leading Halsey to have to adopt a more cautious stance with the Third Fleet since it would lack the heavy AA support of its battleships. While Halsey was a gambler, that likely would’ve weighed heavily on his decision to stay in the area of San Bernardino to ensure Center Force’s total destruction versus running after carriers whose aircraft he would have reduced protection from. It also would’ve meant that any deployment for his carriers would’ve included more fighters staying behind to cover their carriers because of such a large lack of AA cover.

andy smith

2y↑2

I think one of the most interesting things to take into account was that if this had happened to the Japanese fleet, if they had been basically wiped out, what then? They would have been forced to turn to Kamikaze attacks much sooner. That could have had a devastating effect on the US fleet, especially if they had lost some of their fast battleships. That loss of anti aircraft firepower could have been enough to precipitate the loss of even more of the carrier force. In the end, yes, the Japanese are still losing the war but it could have been a lot more costly.

Hugo Davenport

2y↑7

Thank you for these great quality, interesting videos.

Tyrone Marcucci

2y↑3

Adm. Lee got it right. It takes a lot of practice to work together AT NIGHT. Day time is hard enough.

p d

Love the clip of the 40’s US Navy Bro’s leanin back and chillen on the deck with 16 inch guns going off directly next to them. Can’t imagine I’d necessarily want to switch places at that moment but I still love it.

LegalVideoMan

There is a lot of B&W footage of Iowa that I have never seen before. Where did you find these films? I love it.

Dethand

2y↑2

Looking back at the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, where US and IJN cruisers and destroyers tangled with each other at night, probably factored in Burke's opinion, as he was in command of DesDiv 45 & 46. The battle had showed how the USN had made some significant improvements to how they fought at night, but there still was a lot of confusion and mistakes made, even with IFF systems and better radar. It didn't end up badly for the US at all and proved, finally that the USN was capable of not only fighting night engagements, but winning them. It also showed that battles fought at night were not without complications and with a bigger force, those complications can stack up fast.

All told, it was probably the best decision for Lee to make considering the circumstances. A night battle would have seen both sides inflicting damage on one another with little to show for it, other than dead sailors and ships in the repair yard while not achieving a decisive outcome.

paul rhodesia

i have a question. in the intro video clip, towards the end and just before your logo, guns are firing and debris goes flying. ive seen this before in other old videos but never completely knew what that debris is or is it damage or the canvas shattering? love your videos, narration, and knowledge. thanks to anyone with an answer to my question.

f12mnb

2y↑11

Generals and admirals had campaign and battle aims - and only fought necessary battles, not just to satisfy "what if". Spruance was rightly concerned about being drawn off and have IJN force sneak into the landing zone - this was exactly what was tried at Leyte gulf. Lee was very familiar with the record of night actions off Guadalcanal. The later success of the USN in the northern Solomons battles were almost all fought by destroyers at night - except for Empress Augusta Bay. In a night action it could easily become a melee with scores of long lances cruising around - one hit would render a battleship out of action and heading back to Pearl Harbor. The decisions of Lee and Spruance were good ones.

Interestingly Arleigh Burke had participated in the battles in the northern Solomon campaign - as a destroyer commander; maybe a night sortie with destroyers would have been more effective - but that wasn't USN doctrine. Did he suggest that?

f12mnb

@Sean Mac True. He was already being tapped as having a future for much higher command, but wondered if he suggested that as a tactical concept.

Sean Mac

2y↑1

Burke was Mitcher's Cheif of staff he couldn't lead such a sortie

c nico

Just checked the dates and saw kamakazi attacks started several months later, but the use could have been put into play with the 3 light carriers the japanese had. They would have probab;e been willing to trade several planes for Battleships.

Lorrin Barth

Every scenario contained some risk. So, do none of them. Making this choice in the 'Fog of War' is amazingly brilliant.

Michael Snyder

The USN, however, had both effective surface search and fire control radars. All major combat ships, DDs and up, had SG surface search & navigation radar. SG operated at 10cm, and the production version and field modifications had a peak power of 50kW. The SG antenna was a parabolic that rotated at 4,8 or 12 rpm. There was a plan position indicator (PPI) scope along with a "A" and "B" scope. The SG had repeaters which allowed PPI scopes to be placed on the navigation bridge and in the CIC. Antennas could be placed farther from the scopes. BB/CA targets could be detected at 22 nm, DDs at 15 nm. Keep in mind that the radar horizon exceeded the visual horizon, being between 30,000 and 40,000 yards dependent on output power and height of the antenna above sea level. The fast BBs, less New Jersey and Iowa, used the Mk.8 fire control radar, operating at 10cm with a peak power of 15-20kW, mounted on the fire control director, Mk.38. This used both "A" and "B" scopes and could "track while scan" over a 29 degree field. Accuracy of range and bearing was superior to visual range finders. Reliable ranges were 20 nm for a BB, 15nm for a DD and heavy shell could be spotted to over 30,000 yds. The complex mechanical scanning of the Mk.8 FCR did create some reliability problems. The Mk.13 aboard New Jersey and Iowa operated at 3cm, 50kW peak output, using a "rocked" parabola antenna to "track while scanning" for higher reliability and had a performance similar to the Mk.8 though shells splashes could be spotted to 40,000 yds with experienced operators. The FC/Mk.3 FCR would have been on some of the CAs. This was reliable but not as capable as the later FCRs. It operated at 40cm with a peak output of 15-20kW. A BB/CA could be detected at 30,000 yds and a DD at 20,000 yds, but heavy gun shell splashes only at 20,000 yds. Range accuracy was good enough for fire control but not bearing accuracy, so ships with this FCR usually used radar range and visual bearing. By June 1944, USN radar equipment was reliable and resistant to shock damage, but continuous operations at sea reduced maintenance accessibility and reliability. The US fast battleships had the most modern and mature FCS in the USN. The Mk.38 director had radar and an 8 m. stereoscopic RF. Using AC power allowed critical and essential fire control data to be automatically transmitted through "synchros" and input to the Mk.8 "rangekeeper". The automated input of data to the fire control computer reduced errors. The Mk.8 was linked to the Mk.41 or Mk.43 "stable vertical", a gyroscopic device that maintained an artificial horizon which allowed firing solutions to be developed even if both own ship and target were turning at up to 20 kts. The fast BBs had two Mk.8s with a switch "box" that allowed any director to control any turret or 5" mount. There was a Mk.40 director in the CT (or a Mk.32 periscope for Iowa and New Jersey) with a Mk.3/FC radar. There was a fire control position in No.3 turret. All of these stations, including the Mk.38 FCD and the other turrets had Mk.7 "rangekeepers" for auxiliary control. The use of AC power and "synchros" meant that directors and turrets or mounts could be switched almost instantaneously, where the Japanese BBs and CAs would take almost a hour to switch between the main and auxiliary DCT for main gun FC. FC data was transmitted to the turrets by "synchro", but the fast BBs had remote power control (RPC) allowing the turrets to be aimed by the FC system, which was more accurate than FTP and could maintain continuous aim on a target. The "Wichita" had the pre-war cruiser equivalent, with a single Mk.8 and stable vertical, the Mk.34 FCD (18' RF) and no RPC. The "New Orleans" class cruisers had the main interwar FCS, with Mk.31 "spotting" FCDs, which were later converted to 18' RFs, feeding a single Mk.8 with a Mk.30 stable vertical with Mk.7 back-up rangekeepers and no RPC. The DDs had the Mk.37 FCD with a 15' RF and Mk.4/FD radar or some had the Mk.12. The Mk.37 fed the Mk.1 computer with an integral stable vertical. DDs completed after 1941 or modernized had RPC to their mounts. The Mk.4 operated at 40cm at 15-20 kW peak power. The smaller antenna and lower position meant the radar detected BBs/CAs at 30,000 yds, DDs and 20,000 yds but could only spot shell splashes to 12,000 yds. Accuracy in range and bearing was similar to the FC/Mk.3. Mk.12 operated at 33cm and 20-25 kW with BB/CA detection at 40,000 yds, DDs at 30,000 yds and shell splashes at 22,000 yds. The shorter wavelength gave sufficient accuracy in bearing on surface targets but not aircraft. Torpedo FC was similar to the Japanese and the Mk.15 was now a reliable torpedo. The Japanese BBs and CAs used Type 91 APCBC shells, with the PC being almost flat and the BC intended to easily tear-off when entering the water. For a slight degradation in penetration performance, the IJN hoped the Type 91 shells and their FCS would allow hits below the armor belt and through the torpedo protection system. In theory. In practice, the long timing of the fuse to allow for travel through the water and the TPS meant that shell often penetrated through lighter targets without exploding. The one validated time that the Type 91 performed as designed, a hit on the forward 6" magazines of the USS Boise, should have blown of the forward part of the US cruiser, but the fuse timing was so long, that water rushing through the hole that the shell made, soaked the exposed powder and surrounded the brass powder cases (the Boise's 6" Mk.16 guns used a semi-automatic sliding breech block and brass cases to improve RoF) so that when the shell finally went off it did little more damage to the magazines. The 15.5cm guns used Type 91 AP with a short fuse. The 15.2cm guns used base-fused "common" shell, while the 12.7cm guns used nose fused HE. The US Mk.23 fuse which might have still been in use) used a variable time fuse, where the shock of penetration or impact determined the length of time before the fuse exploded. This was intended to allow travel through water and underwater hits, but the fuse was unreliable and was replaced with a fixed time fuse. The US heavy shells, 16" and 8", had small explosive content, this being intended to increase the weight and deck penetration of the APCBC shells at long range. The heavy cruisers did not have the 335lb "superheavy" shell, only the 260lb shell. The 6" and 5" guns used "Special Common", a base fused shell with a cap but larger capacity, around 2.5% (versus 1.5%) of the shell weight. The 6" through 16" guns had HC shells with base and nose fuse wells. They were intended for use as "common" shell with a base fuse and a p-lug for the nose fuse well, but the higher order detonating gaine remained in the nose and the shell often detonated on impact, rather than after penetration. The AA Common for the 6" and 5" shells had both base and nose fuses.

Panzerdeal

It's a pity Lee, about due for a carrier task group command, wan't Given the 9 Independance class CVL in Tf. 38.3 and 38.4 to cover Suraigo strait and support the landings when Halsey went north... just an opinion.

Fred Maxwell

I love watching your videos. I cannot believe you only have 333k subscribers, I would think that should be more like 3.33M subscribers.

Tyrone Marcucci

1y↑1

At this time,none of his BB's had operated together at night in battle line.....He felt this was not the time to train them, in actual battle.

Halinspark

2y↑8

The gunnery officer's comment about their departments not seeing a difference between day and night work doesn't take into account the rest of the ship that has to work in the dark and not sail into the other ships in the same position.

WALTERBROADDUS

Most of the ship is at Battle Stations inside the ship. really doesn't matter what time it is.

Greg Yantz

While avoiding torpedoes, yes. Exactly.

It was just that kind of focus on individual ship gunnery almost to the exclusion of all other considerations that had led to so many disasters in the Solomons.

Bill Scott

As always, amazing work!

Al D

2y↑7

7:22 Admiral Lee? Cold feet? Sounds like classic Monday morning quarterbacking, Professor Millett. Lee took a logical and dispassionate assessment of the situation.